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United Germany, Nationalism and Militarism:
Potsdam and the Maintenance of Tradition
Donald Abenheim
Since the people of the former German Democratic Republic
threw off the bonds of communism and breached the concrete of the
inner-German border, American interest in Germany has grown
steadily. While most opinion polls in the period 1989-1990 indicated
an overwhelmingly positive American attitude toward the unification
of Germany, the breathtaking events connected with the
transformation of Europe were accompanied in the United States by
lingering doubts among certain members of the political class about
the revival of German power and the reappearance of the
xenophobia that had been so dominant from the Wilhelmine era on.
Tellingly, those Americans anxious about nationalism in a united
Germany described their fears with words and images drawn almost
exclusively from the world before 1945. Scarcely a year passed after
unification, before this process led some Americans to reflect with
anxiety on the apparent historical meaning of Potsdam.
In the summer of 1991, as the descendants of the Hohenzollern
dynasty and the inhabitants of Potsdam prepared to re-inter the
remains of King Frederick II at Sanssouci, a correspondent of the
New York Times discovered "troubling signs of resurgent nationalism
in the newly united nation [of Germany]. "(1) Unsettling for this most
respected of US newspapers was the question of "how should the
nation honor a long-dead Prussian emperor [sic]?" The "ornate and
lavish" ceremony, replete with "attendants in period uniforms," as
well as German army officers, a police orchestra, and a crowd of
thousands might well arouse unhappy memories of the "traditions of
prussian militarism?" Worse'still, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the
architect of German unity planned to be among the tens of
thousands. The article equated his intended presence beside
Frederick's grave with the disastrous US-German spectacle of 1985,
when President Ronald Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid a
wreath at a military cemetery at Bitburg in the Eifel. The creators of
the Bitburg ceremony had hoped to underscore solidarity among
NATO allies and to express gratitude to the Federal Republic of
Germany for its steadfastness in the storm of the Intermediate
Nuclear Force deployments of 1933. But all too quickly, in the eyes of
American critics, this organized television symbolism of alliance
cohesion became nothing less then a means to honor the dead of the
Waffen-SS, and by implication, to excuse the death's head warders of
Auschwitz.
The ease with which the correspondent of the New York Times
could juxtapose the two ceremonies underscores how difficult many
critics find the "uses of the Prussian heritage for today's political
purposes." Such a politically inspired use of the past, the article
concluded, might well encourage "the wrong kind of German
patriotism." All too quickly and with a depressing superficiality, an
American publicist linked the ideal of Potsdam and Prussian virtues
with national socialism and the executors of its most reprehensible
policies. Most important for the subject of this essay: the link between
the glories of the Prussian past and the evils of Nazism remains the
catch-phrase "Prussian militarism."
Reflection about Potsdam as a historical force at the end of the
20th century confronts an American observer of Germany with
oversimplified images of the past still deeply scarred by the Nazi
manipulation of what all too many see as a unitary Prussian-German
tradition. The unification of Germany in 1990 has revived cliches in
the United States about Potsdam and the Prussian-German past that
had dimmed with the years since 1945. In this narrow view, the
Prussian-German past stretches back in time as a long and bloody
preparation for the coming of Adolf Hitler. Those attributes of the
Prussian heritage that its defenders associate with Potsdam-
simplicity, modesty, conscientiousness and self-sacrifice—are really
nothing more than the naive qualities that, in the hands of militarists,
enemies of democracy, and national socialists, allowed them to
unleash their disasters. One cannot escape the odd feeling that the
sights and sounds of Josef Goebbels' "Day of Potsdam" are only a
few months old, and the correspondent of the New York Times
accepted at face value the propagandist^ attempt of the national
socialists to seize the myths and legends of Frederick's Prussia for
their own. This caricature reduces to absurdity the complex process
of alliance formation between German conservatives and national
socialists from 1930 until 1933; further, it makes nonsense of the
dynamics of this alliance as applied to the Reichswehr for which
Potsdam symbolized a unifying ethos of military professionalism. (2)
This caricature of German history is clearly evident in William
L. Shirer's script for Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" film of 1945. It
posits continuity between the Hohenzollerns of the 18th century, the
wars of German unification, the Day of Potsdam and the second
world war. This generalization is also true of Shirer's magnum opus
of three decades ago, the Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which
embodies this caricature of Prussian-German history and is still a
widely read book in the United States. (3) These generalizations are to
be found in yet another work with origins in psychological warfare,
A.J. P. Taylor's Course of German History, which portrays the
development of Prussia and Germany in similarly bleak and pre-
ordained terms. (4) Perhaps more daunting for a contemporary
American historian of Germany, Shirer's revised afterword for his
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, published in May 1990, suggests
that, despite more than forty years of democracy, a united Germany
may prove little better than the Third Reich and the world should
keep this new Germany in check with the threat of thermo-nuclear
annihilation. (5)
One can only agree with the exasperated judgment of Professor
Michael Geyer of the University of Chicago, who argues that the
American view of Prussia remains deeply shaped by a bizarre
combination of the theatricality of William II, on the one hand, and,
on the other, by William's shadow in Eric von Stroheim (an Austrian-
trained officer turned director/actor) whose film roles caricatured the
Prussian-German officer in the golden years of Hollywood. (6)
The revival of war-time ideas about Prussia and Germany
contained in the New York Times article described above reflects the
persistence of these stereotypes among certain quarters of US society.
This fact is especially troubling when one considers the thriving
community of scholars of Germany in the United States, the intensity
of intellectual exchange between the Federal Republic and the United
States, and the thousands of college students who study about
Germany. One would hope that the sum of these efforts would
overcome such stereotypes with a more sophisticated understanding
of the origins and consequences of national socialism in the past and
present. The persistence of such simplistic views of German history
and its symbols says rather less about the past than about the stresses
and strains of post-cold war America's attempt to come to grips with
a changing world.
The present essay is concerned with this phenomenon of
historical misunderstanding as it pertains to the meaning of Potsdam.
What follows describes not so much the history of Potsdam itself, but
how over-simplified images of the military past accord poorly with
the full complexity of historical reality. Potsdam long appeared to
many outside of Germany as the cradle of the Prussian-German
military heritage. Therefore, the political debates about the meaning
of competing versions of the military heritage in the Federal Republic
have important implications for the image of Potsdam as a historical
force in a united Germany and a changed world. These lines contain
an analysis of how this image in the past and present raises questions
about the long-term effects of the maintenance of military tradition in
today's world. This issue also has implications for the future of the
German-American relationship. Many Americans remain transfixed
by an image of German history confined to a very rudimentary
understanding of the events from 1933 until 1945. They poorly
comprehend the German process of democratic consolidation since
1945. This enterprise is, of course, anything but static and has entered
a new phase with the absorption of the citizens of the former
German Democratic Republic. The following lines on the question of
military tradition in the recent past and the debate about the meaning
of this term are but part of this process of democratic consolidation.
* * * > *
The fractures and divisions in German society after 1871 have
reappeared in the attempt of later generations to agree about the
image of the past and its political meaning in the present. The current
(February 1992) phase of Vergan^enheitsbewaeltigung connected
with the ethical, intellectual and cultural demise of the German
Democratic Republic only underscores this generalization; this most
recent episode has antecedents in which Germans have held deeply
divided views about the meaning and the uses of the past. Amid the
discontinuities that have marked German politics since the wars of
unification, certain members of society have naturally tried to
highlight features of national life that assure continuity and
legitimacy amid a world that has seen the rise and fall of regimes
since 1871. This creation of traditions out of turmoil has sparked a
seemingly unending debate as Germans have confronted the
upheavals of state and society in 1918, 1933, 1945, and 1989. They
have faced a constant choice about the valid and invalid aspects of
the past.
Surely relevant for the meaning of Potsdam has been the
debate that troubled the body politic about the divided heritage of
professional German soldiers. With the experience of victory, defeat,
damnation, and rehabilitation, the professional soldier has struggled
intensely in post-war Germany with the attributes of his ethos and
self-image that have been in the midst of constant change since the
start of this century. All too many West and East Germans looked
upon the conditions of soldierly life in the cold war with skepticism
and distrust; post-war Germany saw none of the enthusiasm for
arms that marked the era prior to the world wars. This phenomenon
of the world after 1945 fostered a constant and at times heated
debate about the impact of the p.ist on the political present and the
utility of the maintenance of tradition in a modern, pluralistic,
industrialized society. While this set of questions now deserves a
careful analysis for the German Democratic Republic and its
Nationale Volksarmee, chief emphasis here must remain on the
Bundeswehr. The meaning of military tradition emerged in the
Federal Republic of the 1950s and 1960s as a barometer of the health
of West German democracy as it struggled with the unwanted
military burdens of national existence in the cold war: the armament
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the integration of the FRG
into the NATO alliance.
One of the most difficult problems connected with the soldierly
heritage is the belief among its devotees that there exists a single
body of military tradition that reaches back to the distant past. While
all military institutions share certain core values, ideas, and customs
handed down from one generation to the next, too many observers of
military life see armies as hide-bound by tradition; soldiers appear
locked in monolithic organizations that resist all change. Adherence
to this cult of the past assumes a kind of unity of military tradition
that reduces to insignificance the diversity and dynamism that are
present in armies in the past and present. A vulgar example of this
phenomenon is to be found in the belief of some Americans that the
Nationale Volksarmee of the GDR was "more traditional," and
"more Prussian" than the West German military because it retained
certain customs and militaria of the soldier before 1945. The
Bundeswehr, where the ideal of a functionalist, streamlined army
took hold in the 1950s, appears to its American critics as devoid of
tradition and cut off from the life-giving roots to the past visible in
symbols, ceremonies and formal discipline. That is to suggest, that
the essence of the Prussian tradition can in some magic way be
reduced to such rituals and symbols as the parade march and the
changing of the guard before Neue Wache in Berlin. In fact, however,
military tradition encompasses vastly more than merely silver braid
on field-gray cloth and a Schellenbaum on parade. It concerns the
heart and soul of military institutions and the process of continuity
and changes in the values, customs and ideas that underlie these
institutions as well as the men and women who constitute them.(7)
Perhaps one view of this unitary, yet tragically broken tradition as it
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applies to Potsdam, can be found in a small autobiography, entitled
appropriately enough, The Spirit of Potsdam, by Kurt Hesse. (8) This
book proved popular among certain officers of the Bundeswehr in the
late-1960s. Hesse came to prominence in the mid-1920s as an author
on the psychological aspects of military professionalism, the legacy of
the Fronterlebnis, and the desire for a "peoples' community" among
the ranks of younger Reichswehr officers. (9) His Spirit of Potsdam of
some four decades later reflects a conservative view of military
tradition and recalls his attempt in the Third Reich to publish a kind
of catalogue of sources of "soldierly tradition. "(10) Within his pages,
Potsdam appears as the leitmotif of his own military life and his ideal
of military professionalism. This identification with Prussian ideals of
military service was, for better or worse, rather out of style in the
Federal Republic of 1967. Hesse's military and historical ideals
emerge in his description of his adolescence in Wilhelmine Prussia
and Potsdam; these images, experiences and personalities reappear
through the various stages of his career in the Prussian army, the
Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. Hesse's evocation of Potsdam
portrays to the reader of 1967 a vanished and vilified world, misused
by the Nazis, bombed by the western allies, banned and dismembered
by the victors, abused by the communists (they were about to tear
down the ruins of the Garnisonkirche) and treated with indifference
and apathy by young west Germans. (11) The richness of the
symbolism and beauty of Potsdam are all the more poignant, because
the spirit that moved within its p-laces and personalities experienced
its final and sublime expression in the attempt on Adolf Hitler's life
on the 20th of July 1944. Thereafter, the combination of Roland
Freisler's Volksgerichtshof and allied bombs reduced these Prussians
and their lovely setting to ashes and ruins.
Hesse's ghostly recollection of his life as a young man, set
against a devastated Potsdam of 1946, is, on one level, highly
compelling; in a way, the tone of the book anticipates the revival of
wide interest in Prussia that took hold in the Federal Republic at the
end of the 1970s and which also spread to the GDR. But on another
level, the book is somewhat misleading with its suggestion of
continuity across the disjunctures of modern German history. For
following generations to regard Hesse as a lyrical exemplar of the
"spirit of Potsdam" is to misjudge 1 the radical and innovative quality
of his conception of military professionalism in the 1920s. His ideas
about the meaning of military service and the requirements of
peacetime training and education diverged sharply from the code of
the early Reichswehr leadership. The publication of his work in 1925
on the ideals of a "young army" led to an outspoken response from
Friedrich von Rabenau, the later head of the military archives, and
Hans von Seeckt's biographer. That is to say, the figure who posed
as a custodian of tradition in 1967, was himself in another, earlier
context, seen by the guardians of tradition in the Reichswehr as an
iconoclast. Such a generalization is all the more true when one
reflects that Hesse closes his book with an extended citation from
Clausewitz's "political declaration," (12) which, one hardly need add,
was anything other than traditional when its author composed it
amid the turmoil of 1812 and his impending break with the Prussian
court. (13) All too many Americans who speak of the Prussian
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tradition foolishly place Clausewitz in a kind of continuity with such
a figure as Frederick II. In reality, the experience of Prussian-German
arms reveals far more variety, diversity, and conflict than those who
appeal to tradition would often have one believe.
But Hesse's work may have been finally more important for its
impact on certain west German military officers. This fact also
suggests, on closer analysis, how difficult it is to speak of a unitary
image of military tradition in contemporary Germany. Hesse's book
was apparently required reading among a circle of men who looked
with veiled suspicion on a senior German officer of the time, who
also appealed to the spirit of Potsdam in a somewhat different
context: Wolf Graf von Baudissin. As a leading figure associated with
the ethical reform in the Bundeswehr of the 1950s and 1960s,
Baudissin had before the war been an regimental adjutant in the elite
Reichswehr Infantry Regiment Number 9 of Potsdam, where the
maintenance of the lineage and honors of the Prussian Guard
regiments of the old army formed an important feature of garrison
life. But Baudissin's career after 1 950 revealed him to be anything
other than a blinkered devotee of military tradition; rather, he
argued that the new army must embrace an enlightened ideal of
service and discipline, all of which recalled Prussian ideals visible in
the reform movement of the early 19th century and the resistance to
Hitler. Baudissin's role from 195] until 1958 as the chief spokesman
for the young Bundeswehr to a very skeptical west German press
brought him into constant conflict about the meaning of the soldierly
past; this role also aroused the rage of veteran officers who felt their
1 1
honor besmirched by a younger generation of officers. Many
conservative younger officers, also skeptical of Baudissin, read
Hesse's lines with pleasure. They interpreted his ideals of tradition to
defy those critics in West German society who detested the military
as a remnant of an authoritarian past. An appeal to tradition in this
context offered a refuge from the conditions of military service in a
hostile society; this reality suggests why the subject of military
tradition has remained controversial in modern German society.
This debate about tradition in the Bundeswehr began in the
mid-1950s and, despite the passage of time, seems to be no closer to
resolution as of this writing. The list of those who have wrestled
with this issue reaches from Baudissin in the early '50s to his
successors of today. By the early 1960s, events compelled the military
thinkers in the Bonn's Ministry of Defense to spell out some kind of
code of military tradition for the young army. Colonel Hans Meier-
Welcker, the first head of the military historical research office, and
veteran of the Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr was one of
the many who grappled with the interplay of history and tradition in
the 1960s. His writings in this context well exemplify the difficulties
that apply both to a historical understanding of Potsdam and its role
as a symbol in the present. At issue at the time of his effort was an
attempt within the Ministry of Defense to draft a compact and
unitary "image of history," to be issued within a ministerial decree on
the meaning and contents of tradition. Such an "image of history"
would form an intellectual bridge between the historical-political
professional ideals of the militar)' world before 1945 and the civil-
.
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military compromise at the end of the Konrad Adenauer era; this was
a ministerial enterprise with little prospect of success.
In a memorandum to the command staff regarding the
intellectual pitfalls of this official policy of the Bundeswehr towards
the soldierly heritage, Meier-Welcker highlighted the fundamental
conflict between the requirements of tradition on the one hand, and
those of history on the other. Tradition, in its essence, is "unchanging,
continuous and free of problems. "(14) Tradition is exclusively positive
in what it says to the present and future. The advocates of tradition
eradicate the discrepancy between historical reality and the ideals of
tradition, the latter of which are adapted to the ideals of the
moment. The person who adheres to tradition takes from old and
antiquated ideas as much as he or she likes; they are thus
conservative. In addition, however, the traditionalist imposes his
ideas and those of his own time on the past. In doing so, he creates
an unbroken picture of "authentic" soldierhood, "authentic"
comradeship, and "authentic" soldierly virtues.
This essence of tradition, Meier-Welcker further wrote, stands
in contrast to the nature of history. "History.. .is full of problems and
criticism." History tries to grasp events and personalities in their
contemporary reality. It seeks to comprehend problems in their own
time, neither as symbols nor as spiritual and moral values. It does not
support tradition, rather it destroys the simple unity of its ideals.
History and historical consciousness, on the one side, and traditional
consciousness, on the other, lie at two different levels. Each has its
own purpose and value, but if they are placed in relation to each
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other, then they contradict one another. (15) Put another way, one
can characterize Meier-Welcker's words as a denial of the intellectual
honesty of attempts in the German past and present to order an
image of history from above. This sin had been committed by those
Wilhelmines who dictated a Borussian image of the history of the
fatherland, and by those national-socialists who ordered a pure and
idealized germanic-aryan past; most recently it has been propagated
by those SED ideologues who created an idealized set of traditions
for the state of workers and peasants — all of these "official histories"
are now objects of political rancor, historical curiosity and scholarly
debate.
Similarly, the attempt to package an "image of history" for the
Bundeswehr ended in failure in 1961; no German soldier since then
receives a little handbook — like the pocket-sized song books of the
Wehrmacht — that contains an officially sanctioned version of the
German past. In the three decades since, the Ministry of Defense has
faced a constant effort to adapt the image of the soldierly heritage to
the conditions of a changing German society, an effort that has
stirred renewed controversy in Germany at the time of this writing
about the legacy of the professional soldier in the two German
dictatorships of the 20th century. (16)
How do Meier-Welcker's generalizations apply to Potsdam as
an historical force in the present? This process of historical self-
examination, of which this 30 year old memorandum is but a tiny
part, reflects a healthy body politic; it is an inevitable phenomenon of
a pluralistic society that is in the flux of change. Such change,
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perforce, leads to a continual re-examination of the past; as a
consequence, groups in society inevitably appeal to the legitimizing
"lessons of the past," which contemporaries in turn often describe as
traditions. As such, there exists, one might suggest, a necessary
conflict between the essence of historical reality on the one hand, and
the partisan and instrumental use of the past for political ends in the
present that proceeds under the banner of the maintenance of
tradition, on the other. Those men and women who today would
restore aspects of a static or overly partisan tradition around
Potsdam are flirting with danger They would do well to avoid the
temptation described by Meier-Welcker to pick and choose carelessly
from the past, thus blinding themselves to its complexity and cross
purposes. The foregoing looms all the more important because there
is much of worth in the Prussian past that has endured despite the
partisan distortions of the late 19th and mid-20th century centuries; it
is ridiculous to dismiss much of Prussian history as the remnant of a
"pre-democratic" past that in some way endangers the substance of
the German democracy of today. Indeed, the challenges of
constructing a new, democratic Europe across the divide of war and
ideological struggle require the Prussian qualities of selflessness,
thrift, self-sacrifice, duty, candor, as well as the ideal of service
rooted in ethics. Those who today appeal to these virtues connected
with richness of Potsdam's past are anything other than Prussian
militarists, German nationalists, or neo-Nazis. One can take pleasure
in the return of the carillon to the site of the Garnisonskirche, and,
upon hearing Mozart's theme: "Ueb' immer Treu und Redlichkeit,"
distinguish this tone from the echo of diving Stukas and the barked
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commands of SS guards in a concentration camp. At the same time,
one should be repulsed by skin-heads and neo-Nazis who slash and
burn foreigners while hoisting aloft the war flag of the German
empire. A balanced and thorough knowledge of the past, free of the
ill-effects of pernicious political symbolism, should allow one to
distinguish continuities and discontinuities in the German present and
future.
********
Those Americans who are anxious about the re-burial of
Frederick II in Potsdam as a harbinger of integral nationalism in
Germany should direct their attention to how Germans have
confronted the political, social, and ethical consequences of
dictatorship twice since 1945. The events in this process, little known
in the United States, fail to fit into the familiar stereotypes described
earlier in this essay; nowhere are to be found roaring crowds,
marching columns, or fluttering banners. What one might describe as
a double Vergangenheitsbewaelt? gung has become a painful and
bitter process of historical discovery and self-examination. It forms a
principal feature of German political life; plainly, those who fail to
understand the dynamics of this process little comprehend the reality
of present-day Germany. What violent nationalism does remain in
Germany -- visible in the disgusting outbursts of skin-head and neo-
Nazi violence — cannot be explained solely in terms of a revival of
the personalities, ideas, and circumstances of the world before 1933;
rather, these events seem to fit within a European-wide revival of
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integral nationalism that affects most of the nations of western and
central Europe, as well as those of the collapsed Soviet empire.
Seen within this current struggle for democracy, the Day of
Potsdam recedes into the shadows, and the revival of Potsdam as the
capital of the state of Brandenburg in a united Germany assumes yet
greater importance. As of this writing, the people of Brandenburg
along with much of the rest of Europe suffer with the political,
moral, and ethical consequences left by those who promised Utopias
in the 20th century. Outstanding in this process are not so much the
revival of the causes of national socialism, and its supposed "Prussian
roots," but the legacy of national socialism in eastern Germany and
the human wreckage of total pol:tical control over 17 million
Germans. The process of constru:ting a democracy out of the ruins of
dictatorship takes place under the gaze of central and eastern
Europeans who face perhaps even greater physical and ethical
hurdles than do the Germans. Their joint task will continue for years
to come and vitally affects the piosperity and welfare of all
Americans.
One might suggest, in conclusion, yet another historical meaning
of Potsdam, that of the meeting of the great powers in Cecillienhof in
July 1945, has greater importance 1 today than the Day of Potsdam in
March 1933. During this writer's lifetime, the victors' summit stood
at the beginning of what for so long was the "present era"; it had
signified the onset of the bi-polar division of Europe and the
dismemberment of Germany, all of which seemed to have become
permanent features of the international system of states. The passing
1 7
of this unnatural and yet familiar world heralds the onset of
profound changes in the relations between the major powers. This
generalization applies particularly to the statecraft of the United
States and a United Germany. Both nations must find a new modus
procendi in a multi-polar international system of states, where the
advantages of supra-national consolidation and integration collide
with the dangers of economic dislocation and social turmoil. This
conflict between supra-national integration, on the one hand, and
retrograde integral nationalism, on the other, has sharpened since
1990-1991. The outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and
Central Asia, as well as rising economic discord among the major
powers reflect this worrisome trend. But one thing that really should
little concern Americans today is the role of Potsdam as the breeding
ground of old-fashioned militarism and nationalism. The appeal to
military tradition described in this essay reveals a historical force far
more complex and varied than many a newspaper correspondent
would have contemporary readers believe; but above all else, it is a
spent historical force. All those attentive to the requirements of
citizenship and statecraft in this tumultuous world would do well to
examine more closely the winged-words that accompany political
debate about the great themes of the moment. The complexities of
Potsdam, military tradition and modern democratic Germany might
well stand as a reminder and warning to those Americans who
continue to see the German present solely in terms of a propaganda-
laden past. A successful German democracy can safely honor the
kings of Prussia in Potsdam, while it confronts the challenges of
18
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